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Appellate Review of Jury Instructions in Ohio
-The Dilemma Over the Two-Issue Rule
The jury should be distinctly instructed by the court... and
without this it cannot be expected that a jury trial will result in
an intelligent verdict.1
THE JUDGE'S INSTRUCrIONS to the jury are the culmination of
trial procedure in Ohio - the final step before the jury retires
to deliberate and render a verdict.2 In establishing guidelines for the
ultimate resolution of the issues, the trial court exerts great influence
upon the minds of the jurors. The judge, with the help of both
counsel,3 frames the relevant issues, states the applicable and correct
principles of law, educates the jury as to its duty, and selects the
form of the verdict Therefore, an error committed in the instruc-
tion may, at least in theory, mislead-the jury.4
When the jury receives an erroneous instruction, most jurisdic-
tions require that an appellate court review the entire set of jury
instructions to ascertain whether the error was prejudicial to either
party. Ohio, however, subscribes to a minority theory known as the
two-issue rule, according to which error in the court's charge on
one issue is disregarded if two or more issues are involved.' Since
the jury's verdict may hinge on the court's instructions, it is essential
that procedural rules in Ohio insure the discovery and elimination
of prejudicial error. The purpose of this Note is to examine the
historical development of the two-issue rule, the rationale which
Ohio courts have employed in adopting the minority position, and
the practical effects of its application. A critical evaluation of the
rule and a comparative analysis of the appellate practices of other
jurisdictions will provide the basis for a discussion of pertinent'revi-
sions of appellate review in Ohio.
1 Baltimore & O.R.RL v. Lockwood, 72 Ohio St. 586, 590, 74 N.E. 1071, 1072
(1905).
2 OmIO REV. CODE § 2315.01 (G).
3 Counsel for either side has the right to present written instructions to the court on
matters of law and to request that they be given to the jury. OHIO REV. CODE § 2315-
.01 (E). See Kish v. City of Cleveland, 102 Ohio App. 453, 459, 131 N.E.2d 260, 264
(1956), which held that a party is entitled to have the jury instructed upon his theory
of the case, provided there is evidence to support it.
4 Hannah, Jury Instructions: An Appraisal by a Trial Judge, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 627,
633, 638.
5 For an extensive but not exclusive listing of those states which provide for unre-
stricted appellate review when any error is committed at trial, see notes 91-103 infra.
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I. HISTORY OF THE Two-IssuE RULE
A. Statement of the Rule
The two-issue rule is a procedural device utilized by appellate
courts to review jury instructions given on two separate issues of
law. It is a means of determining whether an alleged error com-
mitted on one issue prejudicially affected a general verdict subse-
quently rendered. The Ohio Supreme Court, in Bush v. Harvey
Transfer Co.,' restated the definition of the rule which has been de-
cisive of every case concerning this principle since 1873:
This rule as generally applied is that, where there are two causes
of action, or two defenses, thereby raising separate and distinct is-
sues, and a general verdict has been returned, and the mental pro-
cesses of the jury have not been tested by special interrogatories to
indicate which of the issues was resolved in favor of the successful
party, it will be presumed that all issues were so determined; and
that, where a single determinative issue has been tried free from
error, error in presenting another issue will be disregarded.'
B. Development of the Rule
The two-issue rule originated in the landmark case of Sites v.
Haverstick8 which held in a one-page opinion that a general verdict
carries the implication that all issues were resolved by the jury in
favor of the victorious party.9 The plaintiff-appellant sought to re-
cover possession of real estate, claiming title by descent through
marriage and that the deed of release in the defendant's possession
was obtained through fraud. The sole allegation of defendant-
appellee was that plaintiff's marriage was not valid and therefore
the title was defective. Although error occurred in the instruction
on the issue of the marriage's validity, the general verdict was af-
firmed by the appellate court which inferred that the jury had found
all issues in favor of the appellee."0 The court reasoned that the
6 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946).
7 d. at 666-67, 67 N.E.2d at 856. The rule has been stated in several general forms
although each has identical substantive import. For some variations see Centrello v.
Basky, 164 Ohio St. 41, 49, 128 N.E.2d 80, 86 (1955); Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co.,
146 Ohio St. 657, 666-67, 67 N.E.2d 851, 856-57 (1946); Sites v. Haverstick, 23 Ohio
St. 626, 627 (1873).
823 Ohio St. 626 (1873).
9 The language of the opinion ("found the issues joined in the cause," id. at 627)
gives rise to the court's implication. The rule applies to sustain a verdict for defendant
when there are two defenses asserted, either of which, if established, is sufficient in
itself to defeat plaintiff's cause of action.
10 ibid.
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issue of marriage was immaterial because the issue of fraud alone
was sufficient to defeat appellant's claim and that the error was not
prejudicial in the absence of an affirmative demonstration by the
appellant of such prejudice.1'
The principle established in the Sites decision has since been fol-
lowed in over one hundred cases ' and has become firmly entrenched
in Ohio law. State ex rel. Lattanner v. Hills8 exemplifies the per-
petuation of the rule. A defendant-promisor of a note pleaded six
defenses to a collection action and received a favorable general ver-
dict Although the court erred in its instruction on one of the de-
fenses, the judgment could not be reversed because the appellate
court had no means of determining which issue was the basis for
the verdict. 4 The court therefore assumed that every issue was de-
cided in favor of the defendant and that the error occurred in an
issue which was immaterial in the minds of the jury."5 *The court
justified this assumption by stating that a finding upon the one issue
submitted free from error must justify the general verdict'" It was
further assumed that because of the weight of the evidence the out-
come of this one issue would be consistent with the general verdict& '7
- an apparent effort to demonstrate that the jury did rely solely upon
this one issue. Thus without a policy statement or judicial explana-
tion, the supreme court formulated a doctrine which has become the
minority view in the United States."8 Application without interpre-
tation in these decisions left the courts with no alternative but to
follow the precedent established even if it was not dear why the
rule was adopted.
Jones v. Erie R.R."9 was decided on the basis of the not yet
11 ibid. See also Burke v. Cremeens, 114 Ohio App. 313, 182 N.E.2d 324 (1961).
A discussion of this theory may be found in 1 FESS, OHIO INSTRUCnOS TO JURIEs 5
7.11, at 44-45 (1952).
12 For a complete listing of every case in Ohio dealing with the two-issue rule, see
4 Omo JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 831, at 26-29 n.19 (1953).
1894 Ohio St. 171, 113 N.E. 1045 (1916).
14 Id. at 182, 113 N.E. at 1048.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. This is the standard stipulation which courts place upon the rule's applica-
tion to substantiate affirmation of the verdict. The phrase is usually added at the end
of the opinion as a justification of the court's decision which, although supported by
the evidence, could as easily have been for the other party. See also Niemes v. Niemes,
97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503 (1917).
17Ibid.
38A discussion of the various jurisdictions is found in notes 91-110 infra and ac-
companying text.
19 106 Ohio St. 408, 140 N.E. 366 (1922).
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interpreted two-issue rule. Because the court was concerned with
the dichotomy between federal and state jurisdiction, it failed to
ascertain whether the facts of the case justified application of the
rule."0 Once the court found that it had jurisdiction in the case, it
affirmed the general verdict despite evidence of erroneous jury in-
structions, stating: "[Ulnless this court is prepared to overthrow this
well-established doctrine ... the same views must be approved."
21
Dictum in the case admonished lawyers that in the future "it [would
bel ... the duty of counsel ... to submit special interrogatories in
order that it might be definitely ascertained whether the verdict of
the jury rested upon that defense in which error intervened .... "22
An insight into the rationale underlying the application of the
rule was finally gained through this statement. When counsel
fails to take this precaution and a reviewing court is unable to de-
termine what was in the minds of the jury, a presumption will arise
in favor of the party who received the general verdict and all error
will be disregarded, provided that the evidence supports the general
verdict.' The justification for the two-issue rule finally became evi-
dent thirty-nine years after its advent, but by that time it had become
entrenched in Ohio appellate procedure.
The logic of the doctrine was further demonstrated in Ochsner
v. Cincinnati Traction Co.,24 a negligence action. The general ver-
dict for the defendant provided no insight into the manner in 'which
the issue of negligence was resolved because the jury might have
found the defendant either negligent with no damage to the plaintiff
or not negligent at all. Because the error involved the question of
damages, the court held that it was not justified in speculating upon
what ground the jury based its verdict and that "the verdict being a
general one in favor of the defendant, we have just as much right to
2o Id. at 411-12, 140 N.E. at 367. The issue of whether an Ohio court should follow
state or federal law in the trial of a case in which liability depends upon a federal statute
was resolved in favor of state law because, procedurally, Ohio must follow its own legis-
lative rules.
211d. at 411, 140 N.E. at 367. The court rejected this assertion: "It is claimed...
that inasmuch as this particular controversy is based upon a liability created by a federal
statute, this court should look to the rules [declared] ... by the federal courts" which
have different rules than Ohio. Ibid. State jurisdiction was based upon the principle
that "the federal courts in all cases involving the construction of state statutes have uni-
formly followed the rule that the construction given to such statutes in the state of their
enactment shall control." Id. at 412, 140 N.E. at 367.
221d. at 414, 140 N.E. at 368.
2 3 This presumption is accepted in OHIO REV. CODE S 2315.01, Case Notes 662-63
(Page ed.).
24 107 Ohio St. 33, 140 N.E. 644 (1923).
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assume that the jury found in favor of the defendant upon the issue
of negligence as we have to assume that they found for the plaintiff
upon... [the otheri issue."25 A presumption was said to arise that
the defendant was not negligent which, being unrebutted, dictated
that the judgment be affirmed. Accordingly, the error involving
the measure of damages was harmless, and the verdict, impliedly
reached upon the issue of negligence, was affirmed.
In Knisely v. Community Traction Co.,2' the Ohio Supreme
Court finally announced the precise policy reasons for the two-issue
rule. In a suit wherein the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's
contributory negligence were alleged - the classic situation in
which the rule is applied2 7 - the defendant's general verdict was
upheld. The court stated that the rule, while not applicable in fed-
eral courts, is one of policy and expediency found not only in Ohio
but in other states as well.28 The language of the opinion is unmis-
takably clear:
The soundness or unsoundness of the rule cannot be argued
upon principle, because no principle is involved. It is purely and
solely a question as to whether the trial court will be held to a
strict accountability to submit each and every issue in a case free
from error ... 9
Continuing, the court emphasized the basis of the rule:
The rule was designed to simplify the work of trial courts and
to limit the range of error proceedings. It being merely a question
of policy... it is within the power of this court... to either
limit or further extend the rule or abolish it altogether a°
The justification for the two-issue rule was thus predicated upon
a practical desire to "simplify the work of trial courts" rather than
upon a duty - statutory as well as moral - to render justice to
2 5 Id. at 38, 140 N.E. at 646. To resolve this dilemma, the court specifically sug-
gested that special interrogatories should have been filed, an answer to which would have
indicated whether the defendant was negligent and whether damages were actually found.
Ibid. In the absence of such special findings, there is no rule of law which allows a re-
viewing court to assume that a defendant was negligent or what the jury's mental atti-
tude was.
26 125 Ohio St. 131, 180 N.E. 654 (1932).
2 7 Although the original cases decided upon the two-issue rule involved other issues,
the vast majority of cases since 1932 are predicated upon negligence and contributory
negligence.2BAPthough this assertion was made, id. at 133, 180 N.E. at 654, in actuality only
a small minority of states follow the two-issue rule. Four of these states, Connecticut,
North Carolina, Michigan, and Tennessee, are discussed in notes 104-09 infra and ac-
companying text.
29 125 Ohio St. at 133, 180 N.E. at 654.
SO Ibid.
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individual litigants."1 With this reasoning in mind, little doubt
exists as to the course of action an appellate court will follow in
reviewing verdicts tainted with possible prejudice because of erro-
neous instructions. As long as at least one issue is submitted free
from error, the court will disregard all error in other issues and
affirm a general verdict on the ground that such issues were irrele-
vant to the jury's decision.3"
C. Limitations and Present Scope of the Rule
The applicability of the two-issue rule remained unchallenged in
Ohio courts for many years. Once an initial exception to absolute
application was announced, however, the courts became hesitant to
extend the doctrine without at least a preliminary analysis of the
logic of its application. As the courts implemented this process,
numerous exceptions to the rule arose. A chronological delinea-
tion of the various exceptions will permit both a precise definition
of the doctrine and, more importantly, an analysis of the present
scope of its application.
(1) Separate Issues.-In H. E. Culbertson Co. v. Warden,33
the supreme court limited the purview of the two-issue rule by stipu-
lating that the two or more required issues must be completely sepa-
rate. In reversing the general verdict for plaintiff, the court held
that the five specifications of defendant's negligence constituted
only one cause of action; thus there was only one real issue in the
case and the rule could not be invoked to affirm the verdict. 4 The
court stated: "This rule has prevailed for approximately sixty years
... and, while it has not met with universal favor, it has neverthe-
31 Ibid. The court apparently believed that the smooth flow of the trial court
docket was more important than granting the appellant fair and satisfactory relief. Lan-
guage of this opinion indicates that Ohio wished to reduce appellate review, but no
further explanation ensued. See 4 OHIo JuR. 2D Appellate Review § 831 (1953) for
evidence of this void.
2 The rationale in all five cases discussed thus far is that, when two or more issues
are before the jury, any one of them provides sufficient ground to support a verdict; there-
fore, the other issues and their erroneous instructions are to be disregarded because the
case could have been decided upon the one issue which was presented free from error
and which was both supported by the evidence and in turn supported the verdict. The
presumption is that this issue was decisive and that all other issues are immaterial. For
a general criticism of this proposition, see text accompanying notes 124-41 infra.
33 123 Ohio St. 297, 302-03, 175 N.E. 205, 206-07 (1931).
34 Id. at 303-04, 175 N.E. at 207.
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less been a settled rule .... It is not deemed expedient to further
extend the operation of the rule ... .35
(2) Prejudice to All Issues.-Similarly, an erroneous instruc-
tion on an issue which is decisive of the entire case or which preju-
dices all the issues will bar the rule's application, as was set forth
in Acrey v. Bauman.6 Although testimony relevant to only one is-
sue was erroneously admitted, it tended to provoke racial prejudice
against the appellant on every issue; therefore, the court presumed
that such error influenced the general verdict"
(3) Conflicting Instructions.-This reasoning also precluded
application of the rule in Bosjnak v. Superior Sheet Steel Co.,38 in
which it was established that when two conflicting instructions of
law are given by the court on the same issue, no presumption exists
that the jury followed the correct charge and disregarded the erro-
neous one.39 Rather, it is presumed that the error substantially af-
fected the determination of the verdict and reversal will be granted."'
(4) Libel Actions.--In actions for libel per se, the rule has
not found application. This exception merits mention because the
majority opinion in Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co.41 failed to distin-
guish the two-issue rule, although one of the two issues was erro-
neously submitted to the jury. The court held, however, that error
on one issue in this area was prejudicial to the entire case.4 A
35Id. at 303, 175 N.E. at 207. See also Readnour v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 154 Ohio
St. 69, 93 N.E.2d 587 (1950). In Stemper v. Campbell, 155 Ohio St. 1, 97 N.F-2d
25 (1951), the court rejected different items of damage as a proper case for application
of the two-issue rule.
36 134 Ohio St. 449, 17 N.E.2d 755 (1938). See Cleveland Ry. v. Masterson, 126
Ohio St. 42, 53, 183 N.E. 873, 877 (1932) which announced in dictum this very
principle.
37 134 Ohio St at 455, 17 N.E.2d at 757.
38 145 Ohio St. 538, 62 N.E.2d 305 (1945).
3ld. at 550-51, 62 N.E.2d at 311. The action involved a claim of personal injury
allegedly sustained by an employee of an independent contractor while working on
defendant's premises. The court at various points in the general charge correctly
stated the applicable rules of law on the issue of defendant's conduct in maintaining a
safe place of employment. However, at one specific point the judge, subsequent to re-
citing the appropriate statutes concerning rules of conduct, failed to enumerate the lim-
itations of these provisions. Because a proper understanding of the statutes was impos-
sible without consideration of the limitations, the omission was deemed prejudicial error.
Id. at 550, 62 N.E.2d at 310.
40Id. at 551, 62 N.E.2d at 311.
41148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947).
42 1d. at 378, 74 N.E.2d at 347.
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leading advocate of the rule, the late Chief Justice Weygandt, a con-
curred in a dissent which also neglected to mention the rule.44 An
apparent breach in the doctrine appeared with this line of decisions
because the court was no longer looking quantitatively at the num-
ber of issues but sought to ascertain qualitatively the effect of the
error regardless of the number of issues.
(5) Primary and Secondary Issues.-Perhaps the greatest re-
striction on the rule was adopted in the case of Bush v. Harvey
Transfer Co.,4 which distinguished factual situations that do not
meet the standard tests set forth in its definition. The issues must
be independent and separate, neither being an element of nor de-
pendent upon each other, and if two issues can be considered as pri-
mary and secondary, the rule may be applied only if the primary
issue is submitted free from error.46 If only the secondary issue is
correctly submitted, application of the rule is precluded.4 ' Negli-
gence as the primary issue and contributory negligence as the secon-
dary issue illustrate this dichotomy because the latter "presupposes
or implies" the former and cannot exist without it.48 When error
occurs regarding the issue of negligence, the general verdict cannot
logically be upheld by the theory that it was based upon contribu-
tory negligence, for a finding on the former issue is a prerequisite
to a finding on the latter one.4" The verdict in Bush was summarily
reversed as a result of the prejudicial error in the primary issue."
(6) Unwarranted Instructions.-The two-issue rule underwent
its last major restriction in two relatively recent cases. Ricks v.
43 The former Chief Justice's logic in the two-issue rule cases never waivered, as evi-
denced by his dissent in Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 675, 67 N.E.2d
851, 860 (1946):
tIhere is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury's verdict for defend-
ants was not the result of finding the defendants and the plaintiff's decedent
all guilty of negligence. If the jury did so find, wherein could the plaintiff
be prejudiced by error in the charge on the separate issue of the defendant's
negligence?
44 148 Ohio St. at 379, 74 N.E.2d at 347. The dissent of Judge Hart was the only
opinion to even mention the two-issue rule. Id. at 386, 74 N.E.2d at 350.
45 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946).
4 6 d. at 667, 67 N.E.2d at 856-57.
47 Id. at 667, 67 N.E.2d at 857.
4 8Ibid. For an authoritative explanation of this principle, see PROSSER, TORTS
426-34 (3d ed. 1964). Ohio courts have generally accepted the rule. See, e.g., Payne
v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N.E. 85 (1921); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Stephens,
75 Ohio St. 171, 79 N.E. 235 (1906).
49 146 Ohio St. at 668, 67 N.E.2d at 857. The logic of this statement is based upon
the principle set forth in text accompanying note 48 supra.
50 Id. at 672, 67 N.E.2d at 859.
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Jackson5' held that "the two-issue rule does not apply where there
is a charge on an issue upon which there should have been no
charge."" Further, in a persuasive opinion based primarily upon
general objections to faulty instructions, " Schumacher v. Iron Fire-
men Mfg. Co."4 held prejudicial a charge that did not clearly state
the issues as set forth in the pleadings, was inaccurate as a result of
a failure to include all relevant factors, or included some element
or issue which was not properly within the case.
Recent applications of the two-issue rule have attempted to in-
corporate all of the numerous limitations imposed in the last thirty
years." Conflicts have arisen, however, in light of the fact that its
sometimes ambiguous limitations are individually interpreted by the
courts. Often, several exceptions are cited together to avoid appli-
cation of the rule, thus creating new exceptions.
(7) Merger of Limitations.--Schreckengost v. Montgomery"
adopted the limitation concerning separate specifications of negli-
gence," yet the rationale of the lower court's opinion was based
upon a second and totally unrelated principle: that the submission
to the jury of an unwarranted issue is prejudicial.58 The supreme
court reached its conclusion by impliedly relying upon one principle
- inappropriate in this instance - while at the same time super-
ficially reaffirming another.59
(8) Inconsistent Application.-A federal court, in McCrate v.
51169 Ohio St. 254, 159 N.E.2d 225 (1959).
5 2 Id. at 257, 159 N.E.2d at 227. See also Kehrer v. McKittrick, 176 Ohio St. 192,
198 N.E.2d 669 (1964). In Gottesman v. City of Cleveland, 142 Ohio St. 410, 415,
52 N.E.2d 644, 647 (1944), the issue of sole negligence of the plaintiff was a legal
question as it involved a statutory requirement of a certain age for legal responsibility.
The five-year-old plaintiff did not have the capacity to be negligent; thus, the submis-
sion of this issue was prejudicial. See Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Forrest, 73 Ohio St.
1, 75 NE. 818 (1905) for the case which originally announced this basic principle.
0 For a discussion of how influential the court's instructions are in the minds of the
jurors, see generally notes 112-20 infra and accompanying text.
54 102 Ohio App. 347, 360, 133 N.E.2d 801, 809 (1956).
55 Omo REv. CODE § 2315.01, Case Note 662 (Page ed.) sets forth a concise synop-
sis of the various exceptions. A detailed discussion of the rationale of these exceptions
is found in notes 33-54 supra and accompanying text.
56 176 Ohio St. 165, 198 N.E.2d 460 (1964).
57Id. at 166, 198 N.E.2d at 461. The limitation was established in H. E. Culbert-
son Co. v. Warden, 123 Ohio St. 297, 175 N.E. 205 (1931).
58 176 Ohio St. at 166, 198 N.E.2d at 461. See Ricks v. Jackson, 169 Ohio St. 254,
159 N.E.2d 225 (1959).
59 176 Ohio St. at 166, 198 N.E.2d at 461.
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Morgan Packing Co.,60 held that an Ohio court of appeals decision
was controlling in the absence of a state supreme court ruling and
that the two-issue rule had no application when two issues were
submitted to the jury, one of which was unsubstantiated by the evi-
dence adduced at trial. Subsequently, Sickler v. Neil House Ho-
tel6 decided this precise point but reached an opposite conclusion.
In Ricks v. Jackson,6" the Ohio Supreme Court expediently re-
solved the conflict between the two district courts of appeals, but the
fact that comparable courts employed identical principles to arrive
at totally different results casts doubt on the credibility and function
of the two-issue rule.
(9) Non-Jury Findings.-Although the rule is normally in-
voked only when a jury verdict is involved, it has also been applied
in the appellate review of a referee's finding. In Edwards v. Ed-
wards,6" the court interpreted the rule as not to have a "tortured"
construction when applied to an accounting proceeding, provided
that two separate methods of calculating a final figure were pres-
ent.64 In adapting the theory of the rule to non-jury hearings, its
original rationale was totally obscured. Whereas a jury may decide
upon any and all issues in any possible combination in rendering a
general verdict, a referee has the duty to select and utilize only the
correct method of calculation. By applying the two-issue rule, the
court acquiesces in the potential selection of an incorrect computa-
tion.
(10) Plaintiffs' Verdicts.-The theory of the rule obviates
its application to a case in which a general verdict has been rendered
for the plaintiff.6" The judicial explanation is that it then would
60 117 F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1941). The court of appeals decision was Kolp v.
Stevens, 45 Ohio App. 147, 186 N.E. 821 (1933). Prior to Ricks v. Jackson, 169 Ohio
St. 254, 159 N.E.2d 225 (1959), this decision was the implied law in Ohio.
61 156 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). Compare the express rationale of the
court with that in Kolp v. Stevens, supra note 60. Although it was probable that one
issue had been improperly submitted in the case, the court affirmed the verdict, ruling
that the submission of such issue was harmless. 156 N.E.2d at 164.
62 169 Ohio St. 254, 159 N.E.2d 225 (1959).
6107 Ohio App. 169, 157 N.E.2d 454 (1958).
64 Id. at 171-72, 157 N.E.2d at 457. The referee used the cost figures introduced
at the hearing to evaluate improvements of the land. He also evaluated the enhance-
ment of the farm using the present value of improvements, but employed the wrong
yearly base. The court held that the present value after depreciation was the same value
as the original cost (this is the figure the referee found). The court was then unable
to determine how the referee arrived at his final figure, so it applied the two-issue rule.
65 Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Keehan, 45 Ohio App. 75, 186 N.E. 812 (1932).
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have been necessary for the jury to have found in favor of the plain-
tiff on all the issues.6
The admitted error would be potentially prejudicial because it
was essential that all the issues, including the one to which the
error related, be considered if the plaintiff were to prevail. 7 Con-
versely, when the verdict is for the defendant, only one of the issues
must have been decided in his favor; any error is presumed to have
occurred in an immaterial issue.
(11) Criminal Prosecutions.-Although most definitions of
the rule provide solely for civil application,"8 the doctrine has been
utilized in criminal prosecutions. The court, in State v. Figuli,69
when confronted with the impossible task of determining what the
jury had intended, turned to the two-issue rule to justify its indul-
gence in every presumption to sustain the verdict.7
II. THE RULE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Federal Jurisdiction
Although the two-issue rule has been well-established as sub-
stantive law in Ohio for over sixty years, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals has emphatically rejected the doctrine. Williams v.
Powers7 decided that Ohio's rule requiring affirmance of a general
jury verdict notwithstanding the erroneous presentation of one of
the two issues involved "impinges on the federal rule relating to
special verdicts and interrogatories and hence does not apply in fed-
eral court."7  The general verdict rendered was reversed by the
court, which held that it was reasonable to assume that the jury
might have based its finding upon the issue which had been erro-
neously submitted.73
The Williams court expressly rejected the rule even though fed-
66 Id. at 78, 186 N.E. at 813.
67 Ibid.
68 For an announcement of the civil case limitation, see Bush v. Harvey Transfer
Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 567 N.E.2d 851 (1946). The limitation is also expressly set
forth in 1 FESS, OHIO INSTRUCTONS TO JURIES § 711, at 44 (1952).
09 36 N.E.2d 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938).
70 Id. at 25. The rule was employed to resolve the question of whether the jury
intended to return a general verdict of guilty to both counts or only to one. Because
the rule is founded upon the principle that prejudicial error must affirmatively appear
and that the losing party must preserve the record to show such manifest error, these
presumptions have been created.
71 135 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1943).
72 Id. at 153 (syllabus 5).
7 3 Id. at 158.
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eral courts are bound to apply the substantive law of the state in
which they are located.74 The Sixth Circuit impliedly interpreted
the rule to be strictly procedural and therefore not binding because it
pertains to the submission of or the failure to submit special inter-
rogatories with a general verdict.75 Since local law regarding the
submission of general verdicts does not control the federal courts
with respect to the mode in which causes are required to be sub-
mitted to the jury, the federal courts are not bound by the state rules
for interpreting such verdicts.76 The Second77 and Eighth78 Circuits
share this view.
The most persuasive federal interpretation of the rule was
handed down by the Supreme Court in Bollenback v. United States.79
Upon the submission of two separate issues8" to the jury, a general
verdict without special interrogatories was returned for the govern-
ment. The defendant appealed on the ground that the court's erro-
neous instructions on one issue misled the jury. The Supreme Court
agreed and reversed the verdict, although the government con-
tended that the error was "technical" and to be disregarded.8' In
74 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS §§ 55-60 (1963).
75 135 F.2d at 156. Congress may delegate authority to the United States Supreme
Court and the inferior federal courts to formulate rules governing the practice and pro-
cedure of the federal courts. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Sibbach v. Wil-
son & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
76The practice in the federal courts to resolve a conflict between federal and state
appellate procedure, relied on by the instant court, is based upon Spokane & I.E.R.R. v.
Campbell, 217 Fed. 518 (9th Cit. 1914) which established:
It has been distinctly held that the local law with respect to submitting special
findings along with a general verdict does not control the federal courts....
This being so, it is a logical consequence that the federal courts will not be
bound by the rules obtaining in local courts for interpreting such verdicts.
The general rule ... is that the court ... will not look to the evidence ....
Id. at 523.
For the difference between state and federal requirements, compare OHIO REV. CODE
§§ 2315.16-.17 with FED. R. Crv. P. 49(b).
77 Foster v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 131 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 762 (1943). The opinion held that a reviewing court could not
determine whether the jury carefully weighed the testimony in light of the judge's er-
roneous instructions when a general verdict was returned and special interrogatories were
not requested. Id. at 908.
7 8 Roth v. Swanson, 145 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1944).
79 326 U.S. 607 (1946).
80 Id. at 608. The two issues were defendant's alleged transportation of stolen se-
curities in interstate commerce and the conspiracy to commit that offense. Often, Ohio
has held that two issues so commonly related as these are in fact only one issue, thus
barring the application of the two-issue rule. These cases have been presented in notes
33 and 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
81 Id. at 614-15.
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declining to treat the manifest misdirection of the trial court as a
technical error, the Court held that the jury might have been influ-
enced and that therefore such error was prejudicial.8 2 A further
suggestion by the government that the jury would "know enough
to disregard the judge's bad law if in fact he misguides them'" was
rejected by the Court as a judicial invasion of the province of the
jury."
Federal court holdings dearly conflict with the theory of the
two-issue rule in Ohio. Whereas Ohio courts presume that the jury
disregarded the erroneous instruction and affirm the verdict, the
federal courts favor reversal, recognizing the possibility that the in-
struction might have been relied upon. The federal decisions can
be explained by Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,8" which provides for the submission of special interrogatories
when a general verdict is requested. An interpretation of Rule
49(b) was afforded by the court's decision in Pacific Greyhound
Lines v. Zane,8" an action in which error occurred in the charge on
one of two issues. Although the rule could have been applied to
affirm the general verdict, the court was compelled to remand for
a new trial because of the possibility that the erroneous instruction
influenced the jury." The court justified its decision by stating that
"we are unable to determine and.., cannot say that it affirmatively
appears from the whole record that giving thes... instructions was
harmless error."88  Thus, under this interpretation, the appellant
does not have the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the
error was prejudicial; it is assumed, rather, in the absence of affirma-
tive proof to the contrary, that the error was not harmless. The
Zane court further established that "the presence of these ...in-
82 1 d. at 614.
83 Id. at 613-14. The implication was that although it was the special duty of the
court to properly guide the jury through the "maze of facts" with legal terminology,
the laymen of the jury could recognize and disregard an erroneous instruction.
84 Id. at 614. The Court held that the government's suggestion would "transfer to
the jury the judge's function in giving the law and transfer to the appellate court the
jury's function of measuring the evidence." Ibid.
85 See the Notes of Decisions to FED. R- CIrv. P. 49 (b), in 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1965)
for a detailed interpretation and application of this rule.
86 160 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1947). An ancillary statute on harmless error, 28 U.S.C.
2111 (1964), has been interpreted in Niemes v. Niemes, 9 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E.
503 (1917) and Ellis v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St. 628 (1855). For fur-
ther interpretations of this rule, see, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607
(1946).
87 160 F.2d at 737.
88 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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structions provides no assurance that the error did not materially
affect the jury's verdict."89
B. The Rule in Various States
The vast majority of states adhere to a doctrine which requires
reversal when one of two issues is submitted erroneously to the jury
and a general verdict is returned. In many states, this principle is
applied as a matter of course and without expressly rejecting the
two-issue rule.
(1) Possibility of Prejudicial Error.-California is representa-
tive of the majority position which recognizes the possibility that
the erroneous charge might have misled the jury.0 When an ap-
pellate court in that state cannot determine upon which of two is-
sues the jury based its verdict, an error in the instruction on either
is considered substantial and requires a reversal. 1 Perhaps the most
logical and compelling language is found in the opinions of several
Illinois courts of appeals. Concerning errors committed at trial,
they have broadly asserted that "unless the reviewing court can say
that on retrial the result could not be otherwise, the cause must be
remanded toward the end that the party bringing error may secure
substantial justice.""2
Minnesota also has a more equitable appellate procedure than
does Ohio.93 When several issues of fact are tried and any one of
them is erroneously submitted with the return of a general verdict,
the appellant is entitled to a new trial because of the possibility that
the jury was misled by the erroneous instruction." Ohio courts,
conversely, will sustain a verdict on the basis that a finding on the
89 Id. at 737. Ohio's two-issue rule is based on the harmless error doctrine, a theory
which the court in Greyhound v. Zane thought to be "eminently sensible" and intended
to be freely applied. .Id. at 739 n.6. But, whereas Ohio applies the harmless error
doctrine to general verdicts, the federal courts bar its use in connection with jury trials
when general verdicts are returned without special interrogatories so as to avoid the
creation of "troublesome problems." Ibid.
00 McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342 (1936), exemplifies the majority rule
which provides that an erroneous instruction is presumed to be prejudicial unless the
appellee can affirmatively demonstrate the contrary. One branch of this rule is found
in those jurisdictions cited in notes 91-94 inIra which adhere to the theory that the
jury might have relied upon the erroneous charge. However, the results under both
theories are identical in that the verdict is reversed and the case remanded.
9 1 Plotts v. Albert, 120 Cal. App. 2d 105, 260 P.2d 621 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).9 2 Sims v. Chicago Transit Authority, 7 Ill. App. 2d 21, 29, 129 N.E.2d 23, 26
(1955), cited in McKee v. Yellow Cab Co., 36 111. App. 2d 415, 422, 184 N.E.2d 743,
746 (1962).
93 Funk v. St. P. City Ry., 61 Minn. 435, 441, 63 N.W. 1099, 1102 (1895).
94 Ibid.
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issue free from error will merely support the verdict - a far less
reasonable test."
(2) Presumption of Prejudicial Error.-Many jurisdictions, in
presuming that the error is prejudicial and that the burden of prov-
ing the contrary is upon the appellee, have followed a principle
which not only directly conflicts with Ohio's but also extends the
rule of numerous states which recognizes the mere possibility of
such error. For example, Georgia decisions have established that
if the propositions of law framed by the trial court are erroneous,
the error is presumed prejudicial and the entire record must be re-
viewed.9" In Missouri, it is presumed that the jury strictly follows
the court's instructions;9" an inference may be drawn, therefore, that
any error on an issue will materially affect its general verdict. Simi-
larly, North Dakota holds that an error in the instruction as to one
theory is not harmless if a general verdict is returned." The jury
may have founded the verdict upon the issue to which the erroneous
charge was related and the instruction may have been controlling in
the jury's determination of the issues.
By placing the burden of proof upon the appellee, as is done in
9 5 The directed verdict procedure employed in every jurisdiction compels the judge
to weigh the evidence and to determine whether more than one result was possible.
However, the determination is made before the issues are submitted to the jury. Ohio's
two-issue rule authorizes the appellate court to again weigh the evidence, which need
only "support" the verdict; a directed verdict, conversely, demands at a minimum that
reasonable men could not have found any other way - a more stringent test. Ohio's
judiciary has been allowed too much discretion in weighing the evidence. See WRIGHT,
op. cit. supra note 74, § 94, at 361-62.
90 Norris v. Sikes, 102 Ga. App. 609, 610, 117 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1960).
97 Kirst v. Clarkson Constr. Co., 395 S.W.2d 487, 499 (Mo. App. 1965).
98 Barta v. Hondl, 118 N.W.2d 732, 736 (N.D. 1962). A proviso was added by
the court that the rule would apply when "one theory was not supported by the evi-
dence." Ibid. The following states also adhere to this principle: Southern Cas. Co. v.
Hughes, 33 Ariz. 206, 218-19, 263 Pac. 584, 588 (1928); Conway v. Coursey, 110
Ark. 557, 562, 161 S.W. 1030, 1032 (1913); Great W. Sugar Co. v. Parker, 22 Colo.
App. 18, 46, 123 Pac. 670, 679 (1912); Henning v. Thompson, 45 So. 2d 755, 756
(Fla. 1950); American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 225 Ind. 559, 569,76 N.E.2d
562, 566 (1948); Stanley v. Taylor, 160 Iowa 427, 431, 142 N.W. 81, 82 (1913);
Union Pac. Ry. v. Mills, 5 Kan. App. 478, 47 Pac. 623 (1897); Trevillian v. Boswell,
241 Ky. 237, 244, 43 S.W.2d 715, 718-19 (1931); Stewart v. Graham, 93 Miss. 251,
46 So. 245 (1908); Heinen v. Heinen, 64 Nev. 527, 186 P.2d 770, 777 (1947); Stew-
art v. Newbury, 220 N.Y. 379, 385, 115 N.E. 984, 985 (1917); Laffoon v. Kantor,
373 P.2d 252, 253 (Okla. 1962) (the court will consider whether the issues were fairly
submitted by the instructions in their entirety); Tisdale v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 228
S.W. 133, 137 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921); Harris v. Harris, 14 Utah 2d 96, 377 P.2d
1007 (1963); Buffington v. Lyons, 71 W. Va. 114, 119, 76 S.E. 129, 130-31 (1912);
Sharp v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 18 Wis. 2d 467, 118 N.W.2d 905
(1963) (verdict affirmed because the erroneously submitted issue was supported by
undisputed evidence for appellee).
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the federal system,"9 Indiana courts reach a result contrary to that
which is usually produced by the two-issue rule.'00 However, a
compromise between placing the burden upon either the appellant
or the appellee has been achieved by the courts of New Jersey.'
Through an analysis of the various state interpretations of the two-
issue rule, it was deduced that the minority rule followed in Ohio
was less equitable; the court implied that the majority rule as inter-
preted in both state and federal courts placed too heavy a burden
upon the appellee in light of the manifest desire to construe all
inferences in favor of the lower court's verdict.'0 2 A middle ground
was thereby established by which the appellant has the burden of
showing that the verdict "'appears' to give rise to a substantial in-
justice."' 03
(3) Adoption of the Two-Issue Rule.-The few states which
adhere to the minority position employ basically the same rationale
that has been adopted in Ohio. Tennessee is an example.' North
Carolina0 5 and Michigan °6 also utilize the rule, but in these states
a distinguishing factor justifies formulation and negates its true
existence. Connecticut ' applies the rule not only when error oc-
99 The federal rule and its underlying rationale is found in notes 85-89 supra and
accompanying text.1 0 Drolet v. Pennsylvania R.R. 130 Ind. App. 549, 555, 164 N.E.2d 555, 558
(1960). The court, quoting from an earlier Indiana case, stated that "the giving of
erroneous instructions is presumed prejudicial, and the burden is on appellee to show
by the record that the appellant was not harmed thereby." See also MacDonald v. Firth,
202 Va. 900, 904, 121 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1961), in which the Virginia Supreme Court
announced a general principle which exemplifies both the federal rule and the rule of
most states: "[Ajs all error is presumed to be prejudicial we cannot say that the errors
complained of were harmless and did not influence the jurors in arriving at their verdict."
01 Maccia v. Tynes, 39 N.J. Super. 1, 120 A.2d 263 (Super. Ct. 1956). New Jer-
sey bases their middle position on N.J. RULES 1:5-3 (b), which is patterned after FED.
R. Civ. P. 61. The old New Jersey law of Ruckman v. Bergholz, 37 N.J.L. 437 (1874)
demanded conclusive proof that the appellant was not prejudiced by the error before
the verdict could be affirmed.
102 39 N.J. Super. at 11, 120 A.2d at 269.
103 Ibid.
10 4 Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962),
defining Tennessee law as established in Tennessee Cent. R.R. v. Ulmenstetter, 155 Tenn.
235, 291 S.W. 452 (1927).
10 5 Redd v. Mecklenburg Nurseries, Inc., 241 N.C. 385, 85 S.E.2d 311 (1955).
A stipulation between the parties rendered the second issue, upon which the erroneous
charge was given, immaterial to the jury's verdict. The second issue could therefore be
considered nonexistent.
'
0 6 Termaar v. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co., 362 Mich. 598, 107 N.W.2d 783
(1961). The record in fact disclosed that the jury based the verdict upon the negli-
gence issue and never considered the incorrectly submitted issue of contributory neg-
ligence.
107 Hardy v. Weitzman, 162 A.2d 507 (Conn. 1960).
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curs in the charge on contributory negligence, as does Ohio, but also
when the charge on negligence is erroneous. Thus, that state has
an even more rigid system of appellate review than does Ohio."0 8
This analysis demonstrates that Ohio's adoption of the two-issue
rule places it in the vast minority of states. The soundness of the
majority rationale is substantiated by the most eminent legal author-
ities. 0  While it is true that the latter view - by granting new
trials instead of sustaining potentially tainted verdicts - imposes a
burden upon already backlogged trial dockets, it is more likely to
insure justice for every litigant.
IH. PRACTICAL RESULTS OF THE RULE
The theory of the two-issue rule is that the jury disregards an
erroneous instruction in deciding an issue or disregards the entire
issue to which the instruction related."0 Such error is, by necessity,
presumed to be harmless. This presumption conflicts with both the
weight of authority and sound reasoning, for it is generally accepted
that faulty instructions are the greatest single source of reversible
error.
1
A. The Effect of Jury Instructions
(1) Province of Judge and Jury.-Since, in the furtherance of
justice, the trial court is vested with the authority to supervise the
intelligent submission of a cause of action to a jury, it is the province
of the court to instruct the jury on the principles of law applicable
to the case." The jury, by design, is composed of laymen who are to-
tally unfamiliar with these principles as well as with the procedure
108 Ohio specifically rejects the two-issue rule in a situation involving an erroneous
charge on the primary issue of negligence. Case authority and rationale on this excep-
tion to application of the rule have been explained in notes 45-49 supra and accompany-
ing text. Connecticut, in recognizing no difference between errors in the primary and
secondary issues, unequivocally applies the rule.
10 Cf. 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 61.02-.03, .10 (2d ed. 1954); 1 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENcE § 21 (3d ed. 1940).
'Io I FESS, op. cit. supra note 68, § 7.11, at 44.
11 Trusty, The Value of Clear Instructions, 15 KAN. CITY L. REV. 9 (1947);
Wright, Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury, 53 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (1955).
112 See FED. R. CIV. P. 51 which provides:
At the dose of the evidence, or at such earlier time during the trial as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. The court shall inform coun-
sel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the
jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are com-
pleted ....
OMo REV. CODE § 2315.01 (G) provides: 'The court, after argument is concluded,
before proceeding with other business, shall charge the jury." Juries were originally wit-
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to be followed in reaching a verdict."' Thus, the manifest purpose
of the court's instructions is to guide the jury by providing both a
fair understanding of the issues involved and a basis for reasonable
comprehension of the applicable rules of law.
In Ohio, the trial judge is required to state the controverted is-
sues separately and definitely in his general instructions in addition
to any specific instructions necessary to each such issue." 4  The
judge must fully understand the issues involved "for nothing is more
vital to the securing of a fair trial than the instructions of the court
to the jury as to the law of the case.""' 5 The difficulty which even
learned judges often encountered in defining the issues".. is indica-
tive of the dilemma surrounding appellate review of general ver-
dicts. Great credence is added to the charges in light of the fact
that juries must be advised that all instructions emanate from the
bench; thus the bench gains a position of prominence in the eyes
nesses, not triers of fact; this created an image which dominated for several hundred
years. At the same time, the control of juries was arbitrary and, at best, limited. FOR-
SYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 206-07 (1852). In 1670, Bushel's Case was handed
down with an examination in Judge Vaughan's opinion of the theory that questions of
law are for the court and questions of fact are for the jury. The enunciation of this
concept as the "neat term" it is today was originally in Lord Coke's report of Heydon's
Case, 2 Co. Rep. (pt. 4) 41a-42b (K.B. 1585); both cases are cited in Farley, Instruc-
tions to Juries - Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE i.J. 194, 198 (1933).
At the end of modern trials, the court is aware of the controverted legal issues, and
the jury is fully aware of the relevant facts. The court then advises the jury of the law,
and the jury applies it to reach a verdict. Id. at 205-06.
113 The purpose of jury instructions in any case is and should be to advise the
jurors of the principles of law applicable to the particular facts of the case as
simply and succinctly as possible. Too many attorneys and judges fail to do
this effectively because they forget that jurors are not lawyers or versed in legal
terminology, and that they become confused by complicated and voluminous
instructions. Wiehl, Instructing a Jury in Washington, 36 WASH. L REV.
378, 379 (1961). (Footnote omitted.)
114Oio REV. CODE § 2315.01. For the text of this statute, see note 112 supra.
See, e.g., Simko v. Miller, 133 Ohio St. 345, 13 N.E.2d 914 (1938); King v. Ohio Nat'l
Bank, 62 Ohio App. 266, 23 N.E.2d 847 (1939). The court is further required to state
to the jury all issues in a dear, concise, and accurate manner, doing so fully and fairly.
Beck v. Beagle, 28 Ohio App. 508, 162 N.E. 810 (1927).
"5 American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, 86 Ohio St. 117, 123, 99 N.E. 89, 90
(1912). One major criticism of the jury system is predicated upon the failure of the
trial judge to explain dearly to the jurors in simple language the rules of law which are
to be utilized. Hannah, Jury Instructions: An Appraisal by a Trial judge, 1963 U. ILL.
LF. 627, 630.
Since it is not sufficient to permit jurors to determine the issues from listening solely
to the pleadings, the court has the obligation to supply the jury with every tool necessary
to render a just verdict. "[I~n almost every case, there are intricacies which the jury,
from lack of legal knowledge and experience, cannot unravel without the assistance of
the court The jury should be distinctly instructed by the court ...... Baltimore &
O.R.R. v. Lockwood, 72 Ohio St. 586, 590, 74 N.E. 1071, 1072 (1905).
"
6 Ibid.
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of the jurors." 7 The typical juror invariably gives at least as much
consideration to the instruction of the court as to the arguments of
counsel." 8  The United States Supreme Court has stated that "it is
obvious that under any system of jury trial the influence of the trial
judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and
that his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and
may prove controlling." " The trial judge must thus frame the
instructions for a general verdict"2 with extreme caution to avoid
influencing the jury to render a verdict that normally would not
have been reached.
(2) Appellate Review.--Appellate courts are vested with au-
thority to reverse a verdict which is contrary to the weight of the
evidence or is the product of a jury that either misunderstood the
law or was misled by the judge's instructions.' The court must
necessarily assume that the verdict is free from prejudice, thereby
placing the burden upon the appellant to demonstrate precisely in
what manner the jury was misled, misinformed, or confused. 22 Fur-
thermore, although error is admitted in the trial court, the appellant
not only has the difficult task of relating the error to the verdict
but also must show a reasonable likelihood that the jury relied upon
that error." The appellate court does not review the verdict but
hypothesizes on whether the jury might have been misled by the
erroneous instruction." 4
1 7 Corboy, Pattern Jury Instructions - Their Fanction and Effectiveness, 32 INS.
COUNSEL J. 57 (1965). '"he jurors regard the instructions as originating with the
judge and presumably consider his remarks with greater care." ALEi'DEm, JURY
INSTEUCTIoNS ON MEDICAL ISSUES 8 (1966).
"1 Id. at 9.
110 Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894). For further statements of
this idea, see, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946).
120 Ohio provides three forms of jury verdicts: general verdict, OHIO Rnv. CODE
§ 2315.13; special verdict, OHIO REV. CODE 55 2315.14-.15; and general verdicts cou-
pled with special findings or interrogatories, Orno REv. CODE §5 2315.16.17. This
discussion assumes that a general verdict has been requested and rendered. The problems
arising under this form of verdict are the subject of this Note. Special verdicts and
special findings determine by the specific detailed answer whether the erroneous instruc-
tion was prejudicial.
The general verdict, on the other hand, merely requires a decision for or against one
party with no insight into how the jury arrived at that conclusion. It therefore is im-
possible to determine whether the error misled the jury or prejudiced the verdict. Solu-
tions to this dilemma are enunciated in notes 142-45 infra and accompanying text.
121 Farley, supra note 112, at 211. For an Ohio holding, see Pendleton St. R.R v.
Stallman, 22 Ohio St 1 (1871).
1221 FESS, OHIO INSTRUCnONS TO JURIES § 7.11, at 45 (1952).
23 E.g., Eaton v. Askins, 95 Ohio App. 131, 118 N.E.2d 203 (1953); Harris v.
Harris, 14 Utah 2d 96, 377 P.2d 1007 (1963).
12 4 Farley, supra note 112, at 211. See also Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Spe-
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On the other hand, studies have demonstrated that forty percent
of all reversals arise from faulty instructions; 25 therefore, the ap-
pellate court should make every effort to assure itself that the erro-
neous instruction played no part in the jury's verdict. In Ohio, the
application of the two-issue rule limits the effectiveness of appellate
review because the courts rely upon the unwarranted assumption
that error in only one of two issues is immaterial.
B. Theoretical Application
In light of the influential function of jury instructions in trial
procedure, it is questionable whether a jury would realize that an
instruction was erroneous and disregard it, as the first tenet of the
two-issue rule presumes. The second assumption of the two-issue
rule, that one issue submitted free from error will support a general
verdict for the defendant notwithstanding the erroneous submission
of a second issue, would be valid if appellate courts were authorized
to weigh the evidence. Otherwise, it constitutes an invasion of the
province of the jury in that the court places itself in the minds of
the jurors so as to determine how the issue was decided.2 There
exists no method other than the submission of special interroga-
tories to determine the outcome of one issue in a general verdict.
A hypothetical situation will illustrate the illogical application
of the rule. Plaintiff sues defendant in negligence. Defendant al-
leges contributory negligence, the issue on which error is committed
when the court instructs the jury. A general verdict for defendant
ensues, meaning either: (1) that the defendant was not negligent;
or (2) that the defendant was negligent but the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent. Assume that the weight of evidence supports
the first solution - that defendant was not negligent. If the second
solution were actually used, however, the error substantially affected
the verdict because in its absence the jury might not have found
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Thus the practical
application of the rule, despite (and perhaps in light of) the stated
judicial public policy, leaves doubt as to the existence of a theoretical
cid, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258-61 (1920). A noted authority has also stated:
And while it has been said that "twelve men can easily understand more law
in a minute than the judge can explain in an hour," we believe this is not
because of the incompetency or lack of integrity of the jurors. Rather, it is
due to the judge's lack of clarity in instructing them. Hannah, supra note 115,
at 629. (Footnote omitted.)
125 Trusty, supra note 111.
126 "[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance.... that the judgment was not substan-
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approach at all. 'To simplify the trial work and to limit the range
of error proceedings" '127 is the only justification for its application.
Unfortunately, its sole practical effect is a reduction in remanded
trials and overcrowded dockets. 2 ' It thus appears that Ohio courts
have adopted a rule which sacrifices justice for expediency. 9
The New Jersey courts have adopted the most practicable ap-
proach to the problem of appellate review of instructions.' In-
stead of either party being compelled to disprove prejudice, the ap-
pellant must show only that the verdict "appears" to give rise to
substantial injustice, because it is difficult and sometimes impossible
to show conclusively that a general verdict resulted from prejudice.
The majority rule compensates for the inequity imposed upon the
appellant by assuming that all error is prejudicial unless proven
tially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not
affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the re-
sult." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
The court, in speaking of § 269 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 391 (1964), went
on to discount the theory of presumptions which has sprung up around appellate review.
It was further stated in Spokane & I.E.R.1 v. Campbell, 217 Fed. 518, 523 (9th
Cir. 1914) that "the general rule with respect to this subject [interpreting verdicts] is
that the court ... will not look to the evidence .... " Of course, the court can weigh
the evidence at several different points in the proceeding and render a directed ver-
dict, but this can only occur before the case is given over for jury deliberation and
then only upon issues as to which reasonable men could not agree. Once the case is
deemed triable by the jury, the court has relinquished its authority to weigh the evidence.
Ellis v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St. 628, 645-46 (1855), overruled on other
grounds by Hamden Lodge, I.CO.F. v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E.
246 (1934), is one of the early cases which established this procedure by judicial de-
cision; no statute confers such power upon the court. 52 OHIo JuR. 2D Trial § 115
(1962). In Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946), the Court stated:
In view of the place of importance that trial by jury has in our Bill of Rights,
it is not to be supposed that Congress intended to substitute the belief of ap-
pellate judges in the guilt of an accused, however justifiably engendered by the
dead record, for ascertainment of guilt by a jury under appropriate, judicial
guidance, however cumbersome that process may be. ld. at 615.
The implication stemming from this statement is that the jury is charged with one spe-
cific function - to weigh the evidence and achieve a just verdict - and that the judge
may not supplant the jury in this function, either at the trial or appellate level.
12T Knisely v. Community Traction Co., 125 Ohio St. 131, 133, 180 N.E. 654
(1932).
128 In the face of sound logic by the majority rule, the theory of the two-issue rule
becomes instead a mere practical procedure to alleviate overcrowded dockets. Id. at 133,
180 N.E. at 655.
129 Ibid. The opinion, although its writer did not concur in the acceptance of the
rule, stated by majority vote that "the rule becomes binding upon the bench and bar
and should cheerfully be accepted." Id. at 134, 180 N.E. at 654. A rule or prin-
ciple which is sound in logic and theory need not beg for a "cheerful" acceptance, be-
cause rational minds are receptive to rational ideas; "cheerful" acceptance connotes some-
thing less than rational.
8 0 Maccia v. Tynes, 39 N.J. Super. 1, 120 A.2d 263 (Super. Ct. 1956). See notes
101-03 supra and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of this case and New
Jersey's method of resolving this difficult area.
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
otherwise.' 3 ' Ohio, however, in its desire to implement the public
policy behind the rule - the simplification of appellate review -
assumes the opposite and demands the impossible. Thus, New Jer-
sey's "middle-of-the-road" approach is the most equitable to both
parties.
C. Inconsistent Interpretation and Application
Another criticism of the two-issue rule lies in the inconsistency
with which it is interpreted and applied. Exceptions to the general
rule are predicated upon factual situations which appear in theory
to be no different from those situations in which the rule still ap-
plies. One reason advanced for this caprice is that the court has
the discretion to bar application if the error affects all of the issues
or if the error is prejudicial to the entire proceeding.'32 No general
rule may be formulated when courts have such discretion because
different factual situations are involved. Further explanation of the
inconsistency focuses upon the discretion that the court has in de-
termining the number of issues to be determined.'33 One judge may
hold that two allegations in a cause of action are, in fact, one issue,
thus barring the rule's application. Another judge, however, will
find the same allegations to be definite and separate.
The major area of the rule's application is in cases involving
negligence and contributory negligence. The rule is not applied
when the error occurs in the issue of negligence, but an error which
affects the issue of contributory negligence does not bar application.
The courts have explained that negligence is the primary issue and
that, before the plaintiff's contributory negligence may be consid-
ered, the jury must find the defendant negligent.'34 If there is such
an error as prevents the jury from finding upon the negligence is-
sue, the secondary issue of contributory negligence will never be
determined. Thus, whether or not the jury finds that the defendant
was negligent is essential to disposition of the case.
The rationale behind applying the two-issue rule to errors upon
the issue of contributory negligence and not upon the issue of negli-
13 1 The majority rule is fully traced in notes 62-94 supra and accompanying text. A
concise definition is found in the text accompanying note 92 supra.
13 2 Acrey v. Bauman, 134 Ohio St. 449, 17 N.E.2d 755 (1938).
13 3 H. E. Culbertson Co. v. Warden, 123 Ohio St. 297, 175 N.E. 205 (1931). For
different factual situations in which this principle has been applied, see, e.g., the cases
cited in note 35 supra.
134 This "requisite" theory of the courts is discussed in notes 45-49 supra and ac-
companying text.
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gence is not dear. A New Jersey court considered and rejected this
double standard of application by holding that when a general ver-
dict is returned it is entirely possible that the jury arrived at its deci-
sion by erroneously finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent.135
Thus, the submission of this issue with an erroneous instruction was
prejudicial error. "
In distinguishing between the two issues of negligence, the Ohio
courts have not deemed contributory negligence worthy of jury de-
termination because it has been said that error in a charge on this
issue is to be disregarded. 3 Yet contributory negligence is often
decisive of a case.'38
Perhaps the most inconsistent area of interpretation of the two-
issue rule involves the direct conflict between the federal and Ohio
rules. 3 ' The outcome of a suit brought in an Ohio state court may
ultimately depend on the application of the two-issue rule, but an
action initiated in an Ohio federal court can never be similarly af-
fected. Thus, two citizens of the same state can have identical law-
suits decided differently, depending upon the court in which suit
was filed.
135 La Morgese v. Kern-O-Mix, Inc., 82 N.J. Super. 581, 586, 198 A.2d 779, 782
(Super. Ct. 1964).
136 Ibid.
137 For various cases which established this point, see notes 45-49 supra.
138 The courts have uniformly held that this issue is almost always for the jury's
determination and is not merely a matter of law. See, e.g., Glass v. William Heffron
Co., 86 Ohio St. 70, 98 N.E. 923 (1912). An eminent authority has stated that "the
marked tendency has been to let the issue [of contributory negligence] go to the jury
w.. Where enough uncertainty can be conjured up .. ." PROSSER, ToRTS 430 (3d ed.
1964). The hypothetical illustration posed in the text following note 126 supra amply
demonstrates the illogic of the two-issue rule in differentiating between the two types
of negligence.
In Gottesman v. City of Cleveland, 142 Ohio St. 410, 416, 52 N.E.2d 644, 647
(1944), the court, in rejecting the two-issue rule, held that the issues of the plaintiff's
negligence and the defendant's nuisance were in fact only one because the former at best
could tend to negate the allegation that defendant's nuisance was the proximate cause of
the death. Yet the issues of negligence and contributory negligence are considered sep-
arate issues, calling for the application of the rule, although they, too, are so inextricably
bound together that contributory negligence cannot be found unless negligence is first
adjudicated. The difference between Gottesman and any negligence-contributory negli-
gence case is difficult to grasp.
If the rule is applied in the contributory negligence cases, as it invariably is, then
it should have similarly been applied in Gottesman, a case in which substantially the
same issues and interrelations between issues were involved. This example of inequita-
ble application leads directly back to the original rationale behind the rule - expediency
rather than logic - and demonstrates that a procedure founded upon practicality in-
stead of rational theory will result in inconsistent interpretation.
139 For the federal law in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, see Williams v. Pow-
ers, 135 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1943), which is analyzed in the text accompanying notes
71-76 supra.
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The courts have uniformly stated that "we are not authorized to
enter a field of speculation. Not being aided by interrogatories...
it must follow that the [verdict] ...below be affirmed."'140 Yet
in presuming that the correctly submitted issue was determinative
of the case, the courts have indulged in the very speculation they
adamantly condemn. In essence, the appellate court makes an edu-
cated guess based upon the weight of the evidence, which in reality
is a violation of its own statement that courts are "not justified in
guessing upon which ground the jury saw fit to rest their verdict."''
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
It appears that the two-issue rule is a minority doctrine which
has been emphatically rejected in the federal courts and by the over-
whelming majority of the states. The rule, which conflicts with
generally accepted appellate practice, is not justified by Ohio's ra-
tionale because, in satisfying the stated public policy of "limiting
appellate review,""" manifest injustice is potentially committed. If
the policy supporting the rule is as compelling as the courts believe,
then a more sensible and just method is readily available in the Ohio
Revised Code.'43 Mandatory rather than permissive use of special
interrogatories whenever a general verdict is requested would sig-
nificantly reduce appellate review, thus accomplishing the stated
public policy, and would simultaneously provide a basis for remand-
ing only those cases in which error was prejudicial, thereby insuring
a fair review for the individual litigant. The implementation of
this procedure would satisfy both needs without resorting to pre-
sumptions and would resolve the unfortunate conflict between jus-
tice and expediency which now exists.
The major objection to the theory of the two-issue rule is that
an appellate court must speculate as to how the individual issues
had been determined, a matter which has been obscured by the
general verdict. Issue is not taken with the argument that an effi-
cient appellate procedure is necessary; nevertheless, if justice for the
individual is sacrificed in order to attain such a procedure, the system
is intolerable. 44 The submission of special interrogatories would
14 0 Ochsner v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 107 Ohio St. 33, 39, 140 N.E. 644, 646
(1923).
141 bid.
14 2 The public policy rationalization behind the two-issue rule has been presented
in notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
143 OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.16-.17.
144 In Ochsner v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 107 Ohio St. 33, 38, 140 N.E. 644, 646
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alleviate the necessity of both unwarranted judicial speculation and
potentially remanded trials without depriving the litigant of the
benefit of the general verdict. Unfortunately, as pointed out by
the United States Supreme Court,145 many lawyers hesitate to sub-
mit special interrogatories for fear of requiring too specific an an-
swer from the jury.
An evaluation of the relative merits of general and special ver-
dicts is not within the scope of this Note, but it cannot be ignored
that Ohio provides for the submission of special interrogatories or
findings when a general verdict is requested. The mandatory use
of these provisions would completely eliminate the need for the
judicially created two-issue rule. In the alternative, it is suggested
that Ohio adopt a legislative ruling similar to that in effect in New
Jersey, according to which the burden of affirmatively proving or
dispelling the existence of prejudicial error is replaced by a lesser
burden upon the appellant of merely demonstrating that the verdict
"appears" to give rise to substantial injustice. This theory of review
permits the discovery and correction of most prejudicial error com-
mitted at trial without placing an insurmountable burden upon ei-
ther litigant.
Although firmly entrenched in Ohio law, the two-issue rule fails
to provide a logical or equitable system of appellate review. More
suitable methods are available and should be adopted.
RICHARD BRONNER
(1923), the court presented this weak argument: "[M]e have as much right to assume
that the jury found in favor of the defendant upon the issue of negligence as we have
to assume that they found for the plaintiff .... " No justification other than expedi-
ency has been offered, and the presumption should be abolished, espcially in light of
the potential detriment suffered by the appellant
145 In Foster v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 131 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 318 U.S. 762 (1943), the court lamented: "But that wise rule [Rule 49
of FED. R. CIv. P. relating to special interrogatories) ... is, for some dark reason, sel-
dom used."
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